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Eminent Cold War historians have taken for granted that the Cold War history was about a his-
tory of bipolar world, consisting of the United States and the Soviet Union, and they naturally 
dismissed a “polar” status for the British Commonwealth, though they have acknowledged 
that, in the early Cold War, Anglo-Soviet rivalry preceded U.S.-Soviet rivalry. However, this 
article underlines that the United Kingdom possessed amazing amount of chemical weapons 
including confiscated TABUN from defeated Germany, with a powerful delivery system, i.e., 
long-range strategic bombers and global networks of air bases, and that the UK as chemical-
weapon super power could gravely threaten Soviet total-war potential. Moreover, even without 
any integration of this British chemical-weapon potential into strategic evaluation, the U.S. 
military firmly believed that the British Commonwealth might not be able to defeat the Soviet 
Union in a total war, but the British Commonwealth would hardly yield to the Soviet Union, 
and that, with U.S. supply of atomic weapons to the U.K., the British Commonwealth could 
enjoy a distict advantage in the total war against Russia. In other words, in objective military 
standard and American military perception, the British Commonwealth was qualified to be a 
“pole” in the early Cold War, so that, any scholarly approach, based on overlooking the sigini-
ficance of the British Commonwealth in describing the origins of the Cold War, is, to state the 
least, insufficient.
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なされていることがうかがわれる。DO	(46)	94	 (July	19,	1946)	CAB	131/3.	この文書は、元来は次の文書である。ICCDS/17	 (Final)	 (July	
4,	1946).	同文書では、「合衆国との協力」が「最重要（of	the	utmost	 importance）」と評価しつつも、「現在は、政治的理由で、非公式ベース


















英 × ○ ○ ○ ○
米 ○ ○ ○ ×に近い△ △
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